Changing Landscapes and Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono Lake on Takings and the Public Trust by Sawyer, Andrew H.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 50 Number 3 
1-1-1997 
Changing Landscapes and Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono 
Lake on Takings and the Public Trust 
Andrew H. Sawyer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Water 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing Landscapes and Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono Lake on Takings and the 
Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 311 (2020), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
CHANGING LANDSCAPES AND EVOLVING LAW:
LESSONS FROM MONO LAKE ON TAKINGS AND
THE PUBLIC TRUST
ANDREW H. SAWYER*
As the Mono Lake water right proceedings approach a conclusion,' this may be
an appropriate time to analyze the relationship between the public trust doctrine as
enunciated in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court and the regulatory
takings doctrine.
L The Mono Lake Proceedings
A. Mono Lake
Mono Lake is a terminal lake in a closed hydrologic basin to the east of the
Sierra Nevada crest, about 190 miles east of San Francisco and 300 miles north of
Los Angeles. Mono Lake is approximately one-half million years old, one of the
oldest lakes in North America. The lake surface covers approximately sixty-nine
square miles, with a surface elevation of about 6380 feet above sea level. Because
the lake has no outlet, dissolved ions carried into the lake in streamflow and
groundwater seepage have concentrated over the long life of the lake, making it
highly saline and alkaline. The lake is about two and one-half times more saline
than the ocean?
Although too salty for fish, Mono Lake has a very productive ecosystem.
Immense numbers of pelagic brine shrimp (Artemia monica) and benthic brine flies
(Ephydra hians) provide food for hundreds of thousands of birds which nest at the
lake or use it a stopover during migration. Birds which rely on Mono Lake include
* Assistant Chief Counsel, California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB). The views
expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the SWRCB,
its individual members, or the State of California.
I. On September 28, 1994, the SWRCB issued a water right decision applying the public trust
doctrine to diversions from four streams tributary to Mono Lake. See Water Resources Dec. 1631 (Cal.
State Water Resources Bd. 1994) [hereinafter SWRCB Decision 1631]. No party sought administrative
reconsideration orjudicial review. The SWRCB opened an administrative hearing in early 1997 to review
restoration plans called for in Water Resources Dec. 1631, but recessed the hearing when several of the
parties to the proceeding announced they were close to settlement of the remaining issues. Most of
parties, including the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) and the three
environmental groups that have been most actively involved later reached an agreement. The SWRCB
then reconvened the hearing, receiving the settlement agreement and evidence presented by a party who
objects to portions of the settlement agreement. Based on the hearing record the SWRCB will take final
action on the restoration plans.
2. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
3. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE MONO BASIN ECOSYSTEM - EFFEcrs OF CHANGING
LAKE LEvELs 12-15 (1987).
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one-quarter to one-third of the North American population of eared grebes
(Podiceps nigricollis) and fifteen to twenty-five percent of the North American
population of California gulls (Larus californicus).4
The amount of water in Mono Lake is determined by inputs from rainfall and
snowmelt and loss from evaporation. Five Sierra Nevada streams, Rush, Lee
Vining, Mill, Walker, and Parker Creeks, provide about seventy-five to eighty-five
percent of the total inflows into the Lake. Changes in lake volume and resulting
changes in salinity and lake level affect the habitat for aquatic organisms and birds
using the lake. Lake volumes fluctuate as rain and snowfall vary from year to year,
but more substantial changes in recent years resulted primarily from diversions from
the streams feeding Mono Lake.'
B. LADWP Diversions
Seeking an additional water supply to support its growing population, the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) designed a project to use Mono
Basin water to augment its supplies from the Owens Valley, which lies to the south
of the Mono Basin and to the east of the Sierra Nevada crest. The Mono Basin
project involves diversion from Lee Vining Creek, Walker Creek, Parker Creek and
Rush Creek to a reservoir on Rush Creek. From the reservoir, water is exported
from the Mono Basin through the Mono Craters Tunnel approximately eleven miles
to the upper Owens River. The water diverted from the Mono Basin commingles
with water in the upper Owens River, which is diverted downstream on the Owens
River into the Los Angeles Aqueduct for conveyance to the City of Los Angeles.'
In 1936, LADWP applied to the state for an appropriative water right for the
project. In 1940, the Department of Public Works, a predecessor of the State Water
Resources Control Board (SWRCB), issued permits for the project. The Department
of Public Works recognized that the diversions would adversely affect the Mono
Basin, but concluded that it was required to approve the project under the law then
in effect.
7
LADWP completed construction of its Mono Basin diversion structures in 1941
and began operation of the project. Initially, LADWP diversions from the Mono
Basin were limited because the Los Angeles Aqueduct did not have. sufficient
capacity to convey all of the water which could have been diverted from the Mono
Basin to the Owens River. Between 1940 and 1970, LADWP diverted an average
of 57,067 acre-feet of water per year from the Mono Basin. After completion of a
second barrel of the Los Angeles Aqueduct in 1970, LADWP was able to divert the
full flow of the four streams during periods of average runoff. In 1974, the SWRCB
issued licenses which confirmed LADWP's right to divert water from the four
streams. The licenses authorized diversion and use of up to 147,700 acre-feet in any
4. See id. at 1-2.
5. See id. at 4-6, 9, 29.
6. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 3.
7. See id. at 3; Water Resources Dec. 455, at 26 (Cal. Dep't Pub. Works 1940).
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one year. Between 1974 and 1989, LADWP diverted an average of 83,000 acre-feet
per year of water from the Mono Basin
LADWP's diversions from the Mono Basin between 1941 and 1983 resulted in
a decline in the water level of Mono Lake of approximately forty-five feet and a
reduction in the surface area of the lake of approximately thirty percent.' Because
of the potential ecological effects of continued diversion, there was much concern
about the future of Mono Lake. At higher levels of salinity, reproduction and
survival of brine shrimp and brine flies would be reduced, affecting the birds that
feed on them. As the lake level declined, some of the lake's islands would become
peninsulas, allowing predators to prey on birds that ordinarily would nest on the
islands.'" Air quality also deteriorated. Declining lake levels also exposed large
areas of dry lake bed, resulting in severe periodic dust storms and violation of
federal Clean Air Act standards for fine particulates."
C. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
In 1979, the National Audubon Society, the Mono Lake Committee, Friends of
the Earth and four Mono Basin landowners filed suit to enjoin LADWP's diversion
based on the theory that Mono Lake is protected by a public trust. The suit
eventually reached the California Supreme Court, which issued its landmark
decision, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court in 1983.12
The plaintiffs in the litigation sought to take a doctrine that was well-established
in California real property law and apply it to the law of water rights. Before 1983,
the public trust doctrine had been applied to determine public ownership to the beds
underlying navigable waters and to address public access to and use of navigable
waterways. 3 A variant of the public trust doctrine also applied to fish in both
navigable and non-navigable waterways.'4
The public trust doctrine has its origins in Roman law and English common
law." The purposes of the public trust doctrine were originally defined in terms
of navigation, commerce and fisheries, but the doctrine evolved to include protection
of recreation, fish and wildlife habitat, and aesthetics as well. 6 Similarly, while
English decisions applied the doctrine to tidelands, later case law extended the
8. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 3; see also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709, 714 (Cal. 1983) ("Between 1970 and 1980, the city diverted an average of 99,580
acre-feet per year from the Mono Basin.")
9. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 1.
10. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 2, 9.
11. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 75-82.
12. See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 711; SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 7.
13. See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1967) (addressing
public ownership); People ex rel Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (addressing
public access). See generally Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and
Context, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1155, 1160 (1995) (summarizing pre-1983 public trust cases).
14. See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 375 (Cal. 1897).
15. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2041 (1997); National Audubon
Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 718.
16. See Nat'l Audobon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719; Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
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doctrine to all navigable lakes and streams, including recreationally navigable
waters.'7
The public trust doctrine served not only to establish power over tidelands and
navigable waters; the doctrine also imposed on the state a duty to protect public
trust uses, and restricted its authority to convey title or allow use of lands subject
to the public trust. Statutes purporting to convey title to lands subject to the trust
are strictly construed. The state may convey these lands for purposes in furtherance
of the trust, such as for port construction, but where the conveyance is not in
furtherance of the trust, title is passed subject to an easement for public trust
purposes.'8
The law of water rights had developed independently of the public trust doctrine.
The California courts developed a "dual system" of water rights, recognizing both
riparian and appropriative rights." Riparian rights, which ordinarily are paramount
to appropriative rights, allow a landowner whose parcel abuts a stream to divert and
use water from the natural flow of the stream which can reasonably and beneficially
be used on the riparian parcel and within the watershed of the stream, subject to the
competing needs of other riparians.2 ' Most California water rights are established
under the doctrine of prior appropriation. The courts established the doctrine based
on the customs followed in the use of water for mining. Appropriative rights may
be used to divert water to non-riparian parcels and to divert water to long-term
storage before it is rediverted for use. In contrast to riparian rights, which are an
incident of land ownership, the doctrine of prior appropriation established rights
based on the actual diversion of water and putting the water to beneficial use. As
among appropriators, priority is based on seniority: "first in time, first in right."',
The Water Commission Act of 1913' established a permit system for the
administration of appropriative rights. The Act contains the basic water right
provisions which have been continued in the current Water Code, although there
have been many additions and modifications to these provisions over the years.'
Like the public trust doctrine, the law of water rights recognizes initial title in the
state and establishes the circumstances under which others may obtain rights from
the state. The Water Code declares that "[a]ll water within the State is the property
of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by
appropriation in tha manner provided by law."' Until recently, however, fish and
17. See National Audubon Sock, 658 P.2d at 719; People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448,
451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1988)
(discussing extension of public trust easement to include both tidelands and non-tidal navigable waters).
18. See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728-30; City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d
362, 366-67 (Cal. 1980).
19. See William R. Attwater & James Marlde, Overview of California Water Rights and Water
Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957, 959-60 (1988).
20. See id. at 969-71.
21. Id. at 962-65.
22. 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, at 1013 (codified as amended at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100-4360 (West
1971 & Supp. 1997).
23. See Attwater & Marble, supra note 19, at 972-73.
24. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
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wildlife needs or other public trust purposes were not a limit on amounts that could
be appropriated. Predecessor agencies to the SWRCB generally were limited to
determining whether unappropriated water was available. Since 1955, the Water
Code has required the permitting agency to consider the relative value of all
beneficial uses, including instream beneficial uses.' Since 1969, the Water Code
has required the SWRCB to take into account, when it is in the public interest,
amounts needed for instream uses when the SWRCB determines availability of
unappropriated water.'
The California Supreme Court saw the issue as how to accommodate the public
trust doctrine and the law of appropriative rights, two doctrines that had been
developed independently and each of which could be interpreted to effectively
swallow up the other. The environmental plaintiffs argued that the public trust
doctrine should be applied to diversion of water in the same manner as it applied
to submerged lands, an argument which the court viewed as implying that most
appropriative rights had been acquired and were being used illegally.' At the other
extreme, LADWP argued that the public trust doctrine had been "subsumed" into
and effectively superseded by the law of appropriative rights, with a water right
holder enjoying a vested right to continue diversions without regard to the values
protected by the public trust.29
Like LADWP, the SWRCB contended that the public trust doctrine had been
"subsumed" into the law of appropriative rights, but the SWRCB held a very
different view of the state's authority to modify water rights based on impacts on
public trust resources." While the SWRCB did not believe the public trust doctrine
provided an independent basis for limiting LADWP's diversions, the SWRCB
recognized that LADWP's water rights could be reexamined under the
reasonableness doctrine.'
Case law established that water right holders have a duty of reasonableness, to
avoid waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use and unreasonable
method of diversion.3 ' This duty of reasonableness was added to the state
constitution in 1928.3' The Water Code directs the SWRCB to take all appropriate
proceedings or actions to prevent violations of this reasonableness requirement.'
25. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725-26 (Cal. 1983).
26. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971).
27. See id. § 1243 (West Supp. 1997).
28. See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712.
29. Id. at 726-27.
30. Id. at 718.
31. See id. at 726-29.
32. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 19, at 968.
33. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. The constitutional amendment overruled a case, which recognized
that riparians have a duty of reasonableness to each other, but held that a riparian had no duty to avoid
waste so that water would be available for an appropriator. See Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 252 P. 607, 619 (Cal. 1926), overruled by CAL CONST. art. X, § 2; see also Attwater & Markle,
supra note 19, at 978-79.
34. See CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (Vest Supp. 1997).
1997]
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The reasonableness doctrine applies to the use of all waters of the state, and is
a limitation on every water right and every method of diversion.3 ' The SWRCB
and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct proceedings to adjudicate
claims of waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water.' Determination of what constitutes an unreasonable
use or unreasonable diversion depends on the totality of the circumstances, and the
reasonableness of a use or diversion varies as the current situation changes.37 What
constitutes a reasonable use or method of diversion ordinarily must be determined
based on the facts of each case.
The California Constitution declares that the general welfare requires that the
water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent they are
capable." In determining the reasonableness of a particular use, the effect on the
needs of other users should be considered.39 Beneficial uses include uses involving
diversion from rivers and streams, such as municipal supply or irrigation, as well
as instream beneficial uses, such as recreation and preservation and enhancement
of fish and wildlife resources.Y Thus, the competing demands for consumptive and
instream beneficial uses could be considered in applying the reasonableness
doctrine. A use or diversion may be unreasonable based on its impacts on fish,
wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses' The SWRCB argued that the
reasonableness docrine could be used to reexamine LADWP's water rights,
determine whether and to what extent continued diversion might be unreasonable
in view of the impact on Mono Lake, and limit LADWP's diversions to the extent
needed t6 avoid impacts that would make the diversion unreasonable.42
The California Supreme Court adopted a middle ground. The court held that the
public trust doctrine applied to water rights, rejecting the views of LADWP and the
SWRCB that the public trust had no independent applicability.43 The court also
rejected the environmentalists' view that the public trust doctrine should apply to
water diversions in the same manner as it applies to lands subject to the public
trust.
44
The California Supreme Court's decision outlined three basic principles guiding
the application of the public trust doctrine to water rights:
35. See Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491, 498-99 (Cal. 1935).
36. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1980).
37. See id. at 6.
38. See CAL. CONSr. art. X, § 2.
39. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P. 2d 656, 665 (Cal. 1979); Joslin v.
Matin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967).
40. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 106, 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1997).
41. See Environmen'al Defense Fund, 605 P.2d at 6-7.
42. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726-29 (Cal. 1983).
43. See id. at 718-20.
44. See id. at 726-29.
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(1) The public trust applies to water rights, and "prevents any party from
acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests
protected by the public trust.
45
(2) The SWRCB has authority to issue permits and licenses to divert and use
water, "even though this [appropriation] does not promote, and may unavoidably
harm, the trust uses at the source stream."'
(3) The state has a "duty of continuing supervision" over water rights which
includes the power to reexamine earlier water right decisions to consider effects on
public trust interests.41 In so doing, "the state is not confined by past allocation
decisions which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with
current needs."4
In so doing, the court applied the public trust to water right administration, but
applied a modified doctrine that, with its emphasis on balancing of competing
interests, looks more like the water right doctrine of reasonableness than the public
trust doctrine as applied to land. The state has a "duty as trustee... to preserve,
so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the trust."49 In
determining the public interest, however, the state could determine that the need for
the water being diverted outweighs environmental harm caused by the diversion.'
The court also held that the public trust applies to diversions on non-navigable
tributaries of navigable waters which harm public trust uses in those navigable
waters."'
The court did not apply the public trust to determine the appropriate balance
between LADWP's need for water and the environmental needs of the Mono Basin,
leaving that to further proceedings. 2 Those further proceedings could be either
before the courts or the SWRCB. The court held that the courts and the SWRCB
have concurrent original jurisdiction to apply the public trust.53
D. LADWP's Claim of Unconstitutional Taking
LADWP sought review of the case by the United States Supreme Court. In its
petition for certiorari LADWP argued that "[t]he California Supreme Court decision
abruptly took from petitioner City of Los Angeles the permanence and certainty of
its state-granted, vested, appropriative water and subjected them to the recurring
threat of reduction or revocation by engrafting onto them limitations imported from
the public trust doctrine."' LADWP further contended that the decision un-
45. Id. at 727.
46. Id. If the court had applied the same public trust doctrine as applies to lands, "such
appropriations [would have] been improper to the extent that they harm public trust uses, and [could] be
justified only upon theories of reliance or estoppel." Id.
47. Id. at 728.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 719-20.
52. See id. at 728-29.
53. See id. at 730-31.
54. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. National
1997]
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constitutionally deprived it of vested water rights without compensation."
Summarizing its argument, LADWP contended that "[tihe California Supreme Court
decision in this case. . . constitutes a sudden and unforeseeable change in state law
which unsettles established rules of property law, defeats universally held
expectations of inviolability, and expropriates valuable property rights for public
purposes."' The United States Supreme Court denied LADWP's petition.57
E. The California Trout Litigation
As the litigation which brought the California Supreme Court's decision
continued, and before any proceedings to apply the test enunciated in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court were conducted, environmental groups brought
suit challenging LADWP's diversions on another theory. In 1985, California Trout,
Inc., the National Audubon Society and the Mono Lake committee brought suit
seeking a court order directing the SWRCB to rescind LADWP's water right
licenses because they did not include a condition requiring bypass of water for fish
in Rush, Lee Vining, Parker and Walker Creeks."
The suit was based on the requirements of the California Fish and Game Code.
Section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code specifies that "[t]he owner of any dam
shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass through a fishway, or in the absence
of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, around or through the dam, to
keep in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the dam.""
This requirement was in effect when the SWRCB issued permits to LADWP. The
requirement stems from an 1870 law requiring the construction of fisliways by
owners of dams and other obstructions on rivers and streams.' Amendments in
1915 and 1937 added the requirement for bypass or release of sufficient water to
maintain fish in good condition.' When the SWRCB's predecessor issued the
permits in 1940, it did not have authority to apply this requirement. Its role was
limited to determining availability of unappropriated water.'
In 1953, section 5946 was added to the Fish and Game Code, in legislation
enacted in response to LADWP's construction of hydroelectric facilities in the
Owens River Gorge.' Section 5946 requires that permits and licenses issued after
September 9, 1953, for dams in Mono and Inyo Counties include a condition
Audubon Soe'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (No. 83-300).
55. See id. at 23-27.
56. Id. at 27.
57. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
58. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 186 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989); SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 8.
59. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 1984).
60. See 1870 Cal. Stit. ch. 457, § 3, pp. 663-64.
61. See 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 456, § 1, at 1400 (codified at CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 525; 1915 Cal.
Stat. ch. 491, § 1, at 820 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 820 (repealed 1935)).
62. See supra notes 7, 25-27 and accompanying text.
63. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5946 (West 1984); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 189, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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requiring full compliance with section 5937." LADWP's Mono Basin water right
licenses, issued in 1974, confirmed the water right as permitted in 1940 and as
developed by LADWP. The licenses did not include any conditions applying section
5937.
The case reached California's Third District Court of Appeal, which concluded
that the SWRCB was required to amend LADWP's water right licenses to add
conditions applying the requirement for bypass or release of sufficient water to
maintain fish in good condition downstream of LADWP's diversion facilities on the
four streams.65 The court of appeal's decision required that flow be provided to
protect fish downstream of LADWP's diversion facilities in the streams tributary to
Mono Lake, not for protection of Mono Lake itself.' Because LADWP had no
means of recapturing the water further downstream, however, the decision also
meant additional water for Mono Lake.
F. Administrative Proceedings
In response to the court of appeal's California Trout decision, the SWRCB
decided to initiate its own proceedings. These administrative proceedings before the
SWRCB would determine appropriate flows in the Mono tributaries, applying the
requirements set forth in California Trout. They would also reexamine LADWP's
water rights in consideration of the impact on Mono Lake, in accordance with the
public trust doctrine as set forth in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court. All
pending lawsuits involving LADWP's Mono Basin diversions had been consolidated
in the Superior Court for El Dorado County. 7 On September 29, 1989, upon
motion of the SWRCB, the Superior Court issued an order staying further
proceedings in court on the merits of the coordinated proceeding pending the
outcome of the SWRCB's administrative proceedings.'
The SWRCB's review involved an extensive public participation and review
process, including circulation of a three-volume environmental impact report (EIR)
and preparation of twenty-eight auxiliary reports.' The SWRCB then conducted
an evidentiary hearing. The hearing began on October 20, 1993, and ended on
February 18, 1994, during which period the SWRCB held over forty days of
hearings, collected the testimonies of more than 125 witnesses, and received over
1,000 exhibits into evidence.7 The SWRCB later released a proposed final EIR
and a draft water right decision. The Board adopted the 212-page decision, Water
Resources Decision 1631, on September 28, 1994.
64. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5946, 11012 (West 1984).
65. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 210 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989); see also California Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 795-802 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (addressing reasons given for delay in complying with the requirement).
66. See California Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
67. See Mono Lake Water Rights Cases, El Dorado County Superior Court Coordinated Proceeding
Nos. 2284 & 2288.
68. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 10.
69. See id. at 13-14.
70. See id. at 14-15.
1997]
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Making use of instream flow incremental methodology (IFIM) studies, Decision
1631 sets minimum flow requirements for Rush, Lee Vining, Walker and Parker
Creeks." Decision 1631 sets channel maintenance flows, and addresses the need
for restoration of stream channels that had deteriorated as a result of the long period
of little or no flow ' Decision 1631 then proceeds to apply the public trust
doctrine to determine an appropriate lake level for Mono Lake, considering the
extent to which public trust resources will be protected at different lake levels and
the economic and environmental effects of reducing LADWP's diversions to achieve
those lake levels.' The SWRCB concluded that diversions should be limited to
maintain an average water elevation of 6392 feet above sea level, and established
criteria regulating diversions to bring the bring the level of Mono Lake, which at
that time was below 6377 feet above sea level, up to the desired level.74 S u m -
marizing its decision on the lake level, Decision 1631 states:
This decision also amends Los Angeles' water right licenses to include
specified water diversion criteria which are intended to gradually restore
the average water elevation of Mono Lake to approximately 6,392 feet
above sea level in order to protect public trust resources at Mono Lake.
Among other things, the increased water level will protect nesting
habitat for California gulls and other migratory birds, maintain the long-
term productivity of Mono Lake brine shrimp and brine fly populations,
maintain public accessibility to the most widely visited tufa sites in the
Mono Lake Tufa State Reserve, enhance the scenic aspects of the Mono
Basin, lead to compliance with water quality standards, and reduce
blowing dust in order to comply with federal air quality standards."
In addition to amending LADWP's licenses to set instream flow requirements and
diversion criteria to restore and maintain the level of Mono Lake, Decision 1631
requires LADWP to prepare and submit for SWRCB approval a stream and stream
channel restoration plan and a waterfowl habitat restoration plan.76
Decision 1631 substantially reduces the amount of water LADWP is authorized
to divert under its water right licenses. Computer modeling projected that, based on
the 1941 though 1988 hydrology and operations in accordance with its 1974
licenses, LADWP would have diverted an average of 75,000 acre-feet per year from
the Mono Basin.' Under the diversion criteria specified in Decision 1631 and
during the estimated twenty-year period in which the lake was projected to rise to
approximately 6392 feet, project diversions would average about 12,000 acre-feet
per year.7 Once the lake reaches 6392 feet, LADW'P's diversions would increase
71. See id. at 21-33, 38-40, 46-48, 53-69, 76.
72. See id. at 21-23, 33-39, 41-47, 48-57, 69-77.
73. See id. at 77-194.
74. See 1d. at 154-59.
75. Id. at 195.
76. See id. at 35-38, 42-46, 49-53, 71-77, 118-19, 194-212.
77. See id. at 163.
78. See !&d at 163-64.
[Vol. 50:311
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss3/3
LESSONS FROM MONO LAKE
to approximately 31,000 acre-feet per year.' Decision 1631 evaluates LADWP's
water needs and potential sources of supply, concluding that other sources of supply
are reasonably available.' Decision 1631 estimates that during the approximately
twenty-year transition period, costs of a replacement water supply would average
$27.8 million per year." In addition, LADWP would incur costs of approximately
$8.5 million per year during the transition period to replace hydroelectric power
which would otherwise be generated through use of water diverted from the Mono
Basin as it passes through power plants on the Los Angeles Aqueduct.' After the
transition period, water replacement costs would average approximately $17.9
million- per year, with power supply replacement costs estimated at $5.6 million per
year.'
After the proposed final EIR and draft decision were released, and after
negotiations among the parties, the major parties to the Mono Lake proceedings
agreed that they would not seek judicial review of the decision. Immediately before
the meeting scheduled to adopt the decision, the parties held a joint press conference
to announce that they accepted the decision. After the SWRCB voted to adopt the
decision, the two hundred spectators in the room stood up and applauded.
The Mono Lake pioceedings are not yet fully completed. The litigation which
was stayed until the outcome of the SWRCB's administrative proceedings has not
yet been dismissed. Further administrative proceedings to review the restoration
plans required under Decision 1631 are still underway. It appears that any further
proceedings will focus on issues specifically related to those restoration plans, and
will not reopen the basic public trust and instream flow issues resolved in Decision
1631 or the litigation which preceded Decision 1631.
II. The Takings Issue Raised by LADWP
Although the specific issue raised in LADWP's petition for certiorari will not be
litigated, it is instructive to consider the issues raised by the argument that the
California Supreme Court's decision amounted to an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation.
A. The Takings Doctrine
The Takings Clause, included in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, specifies that "private property" shall not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation."' This constitutional guarantee is "designed to bar
79. See id at 164. Actual impacts could be substantially different if actual rainfall is substantially
higher than that assumed in the hydrology used. See id. at 159.
80. See id at 159-62, 165-68, 195.
81. See id at 169-78, 180.
82. See id. at 178-80.
83. See id at 169-80.
84. See JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: MONO LAKE BATTLE/CALIFORNIA WATER FUTURE 173-
75 (1996).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' Originally, the
Takings Clause applied only to the federal government. Its applicability has been
extended to the states as part of the "due process" guaranteed under the Fourteenth
AmendmentY
Traditionally, the Takings Clause was understood to limit only actual, physical
seizures of private property, whether accomplished directly through the government's
power of eminent domain or indirectly through physical occupation by the
government."8 Later, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of regulatory
takings, announcing that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.""
In general, there is no "set formula" for determining when a regulatory taking has
occurred; the courts rely instead on "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' This
includes inquiry into the economic impact of the regulation, particularly "the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,"
as well as the character of and interests protected by governmental action."
Regulation may substantially diminish the value of property without effecting a
taking.'
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 the Court pronounced a
categorical rule that a taking has been established, without the need for any case-
specific inquiry into the public interest advanced by regulation, "where regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of [the] land."' But even this
categorical rule is subject to exceptions, including cases where the regulation bars
uses that would constitute a common law nuisance.95
LADWP's claim that the California Supreme Court's decision in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court was a taking departed from a typical regulatory
takings case in two important respects. First, the alleged taking was not imposed
by statute or through the action of an administrative agency, but by the courts.
Second, the action did not take the form of a regulation of the use of LADWP's
property; the action was a decision interpreting and defining the property right held
by LADWP.
In its petition for certiorari, LADWP argued: "While states, through their courts,
86. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
88. See Richard M. Frank, 'Take" It to the Limit: Reconciling the Endangered Species Act and the
Fifth Amendment, ENVTL. L. NEws (Envtl. Law Section, State Bar of Cal., San Francisco, Cal.), Summer
1994, at 1, 4.
,89. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
90. Penn Central Tranp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
91. Id. at 124-25.
92. See id. at 131; see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in
value caused by zoning law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (75% diminution in value).
93. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
94. Id. at 1015.
95. See id. at 1027-31
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have authority to enunciate state law which defines what is property, they may not
retroactively define it out of existence and thus avoid the responsibility for paying
compensation for taking it.' '4 LADWP relied heavily on Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington.' In that concurring opinion, Justice
Stewart observed that the Supreme Court cannot resolve the issue whether there has
been a taking without first determining who owns the property."8 In noting that the
Supreme Court ordinarily would accept the decision of a state court on the issue as
conclusive, Justice Stewart observed:
But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state law,
unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference
would be appropriate. For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the
constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of
law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it
has taken never existed at all.'
LADWP argued forcefully as to the need to maintain the security of water
rights." But Justice Stewart's views did not represent an established legal
doctrine. Previous Supreme Court decisions consistently held that states are free to
develop and apply their own rules of property as applied to water.' In essence,
LADWP sought to establish a new legal doctrine, based on the views of Justice
Stewart, which would enhance the security of water rights by limiting the ability of
the courts to change the law in response to changing conditions.
B. Ironies in LADWP's Position
There is some historical irony in LADWP's claim that its water rights had been
taken. It was LADWP which, in its ruthless quest for additional water supplies, had
effectively forced out the agricultural water users in the Owens Valley.'"
Although technically not the case, "[t]here is a widely held view that Los Angeles
simply went out to the Owens Valley and stole its water." 3 The City of Los
Angeles bought out the farmers, although many were effectively forced to sell. The
irrigation ditches were maintained through private cooperatives. After some of the
farmers along a ditch were bought out, those remaining could no longer afford to
maintain the ditch by themselves. 4 The tactic was perfectly legal and does not
96. Petition for Certiorari at 24, City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. National
Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (No. 83-300).
97. 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
98. See id. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 296-97 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. See Petition for Certiorari at 11-14, City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. National
Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
I01. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945); Fox River
Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927).
102. See MARC RaISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 52-103 (rev. ed. 1993).
103. Id. at 62.
104. See id. at 90.
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even arguably amount to a taking under established doctrines. But the effect was to
dash the reasonable, investment-backed expectations of farmers who anticipated that
the ditches would ccntinue to be maintained through the cooperation of other
landowners.
Less well known, lut more closely on point, was Los Angeles' earlier quest for
supremacy over water rights in its own area. In addition to the appropriative and
riparian rights recognized in California's dual system, the courts recognized a third
type of water right, called a pueblo right, giving Los Angeles a paramount claim to
all of the waters that run through its territory, both surface and underground, from
their source to the sea." Although this pueblo right is purported to be based on
Hispanic law in effect before California became part of the United States, Hispanic
law had not recognized anything like the pueblo right later established through Los
Angeles' litigation." The doctrine was essentially invented to support Los
Angeles' quest for expansion. 7
The effect of recognizing a paramount pueblo right was to deprive upstream
water right holders who would otherwise have the right to divert and use the water.
If, as LADWP argued in its petition for certiorari, the California Supreme Court's
decision that the public trust applies to water rights was an abrupt change in the
law, unsettling established principles of property law and depriving water right
holders of the ability to make use of their rights, the pueblo right doctrine
successfully urged on the courts by the City of Los Angeles was an even more
abrupt change with even greater impact on the affected water right holders.
It is also noteworthy that, in its effort to place a limit on a state court's authority
to modify the law of water rights, LADWP was itself relying on a change in the law
of takings. If the California Supreme Court has extended the reach of the public
trust doctrine by applying it to water rights, the United States Supreme Court has
made no less of an extension in applying the taking clause to regulatory actions. In
asking the Court to apply the takings doctrine to a state court decision interpreting
the extent of the right held by a property owner, LADWP was asking the court to
make a further extension. If the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the
public trust doctrine in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court could be
criticized for "making new law," would not the same criticism apply to the United
States Supreme Court if it expanded the reach of the Takings Clause to strike down
that interpretation?
105. See Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. 762, 764-67 (Cal. 1895), overruled
on other grounds, Beckett v. City of Petaluma, 153 P. 20,23 (Cal. 1915); Attwater & Markle, supra note
19, at 969 (1988).
106. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s-1990S,
at 126-35 (1992).
107. See id. at 408.
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C. Legal Obstacles to the LADWPs Position
If the United States Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case, LADWP would
have faced a number of obstacles to obtaining relief. Some of the problems arise
out of the particular context of LADWP's petition, but many would be common to
any argument that a decision interpreting the nature and extent of a person's water
right amounts to an unconstitutional, uncompensated taking.
1. Ripeness
LADWP would first have to overcome the procedural problem that the case did
not appear to be ripe for review. The United States Supreme Court will not hear a
regulatory takings claim "until the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations
to the property at issue. '" s The Court's reluctance to address regulatory takings
issues at an earlier stage is compelled by the nature of the inquiry used to determine
whether a taking has occurred. This requires case-specific examination into factors
such as the economic impact of the regulation and its effect on investment-backed
expectations. These factors cannot be evaluated until the regulation is applied to the
property in question."
Similar considerations support the conclusion that LADWP's takings claim could
not be heard at the time it sought Supreme Court review. If the basic argument
underlying LADWP's takings theory is that the state cannot avoid the Takings
Clause by redefining property interests, then the theory should not apply where the
impact of the redefinition does not go beyond what could validly be accomplished
through regulation.
As set forth in National Audubon v. Superior Court, the public trust doctrine
could have had a drastic impact, or little effect at all, on the amount LADWP could
divert. The court established a balancing test which, when applied, might require
a major reduction or even an elimination of LADWP's diversions, or it could require
only a minor change. As the California Supreme Court explained the public trust
doctrine, the SWRCB or a court applying the doctrine could conceivably have
concluded that the need to divert water to supply the people of Los Angeles
outweighed the environmental damage to the Mono Basin that would result from
those diversions, and that LADWP's diversionary entitlement should not be
changed."' Not until the public trust had been applied, as it was in Decision 1631,
108. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981).
109. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 190-91.
110. See National Audubon Soe'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) ("This is not
a case in which the... [SWRCB] or any judicial body has determined that the needs of Los Angeles
outweigh the needs of the Mono Basin.... Neither has any responsible body determined whether some
lesser [diversion from the Mono tributaries] would better balance the diverse interests."). The California
Supreme Court did not discuss the ramifications of the provisions of the California Fish and Game Code
requiring passage of sufficient water to keep fish in good condition. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§
5937, 5946 (West 1984). The California Court of Appeal later interpreted these provisions as a
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would LADWP's takings argument be ripe for review.
The ripeness requirement poses an obstacle not just to a takings claim at the
particular time LADWP sought to have the issue decided. It reveals a more
fundamental problem with the theory that a judicial decision changing property law
can be reviewed to determine whether it is a taking. Decision 1631 was not issued
until eleven years after National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, and the public
trust doctrine has been applied only to a small number of existing water right
holders in the period since the California Supreme Court reached its decision.'
As with LADWP, some water right holders who have been subject to proceedings
to have the public trust applied have decided they can live with the decision, and
have not sought to challenge it."' By the time the public trust doctrine is applied
to any particular water right holder who might want to challenge the California
Supreme Courts decision, the doctrine will become increasingly entrenched as an
established principle of water right law, making it that much harder to characterize
its application as an abrupt change.
2. Relation of the State to its Political Subdivisions
Another legal obstacle was presented by the fact that LADWP is a political
subdivision of the state. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment, and hence the Takings Clause, cannot be invoked by a city or other
political subdivision of the state as a restraint on the power of the state."' This
conclusion stems from the principle that cities and other political subdivisions are
creatures of the state, which can grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees
fit.14
It may be argued that where principles of justice and fairness would require
compensation for the taking of private property, compensation should also be
required when a state takes property from its political subdivisions. But that
argument ignores the extent to which municipalities and special districts have
acquired their water rights as a result of powers and privileges granted to them by
the state. These include subsidies, taxing powers and authority to issue tax exempt
bonds."5 These powers and privileges invested in public agencies by the state
legislative expression of the public trust. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In light of the court of appeal's decision in the
California Trout litigation, the SWRCB did not have the option of deciding that LADWP's diversions
could continue without change. At a minimum, diversions would have to be curtailed enough to maintain
fish in good condition below the dams. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 11-12. At the time
LADWP asked the Supreme Court to hear its takings claim, however, the possibility that the public trust
balancing might be struel: in favor of continuing diversions as authorized under its water right licenses
could not be ruled out.
111. See generally Weber, supra note 13 (reviewing cases and administrative decisions applying the
public trust doctrine).
112. See, e.g., SWRCB Order WR 95-4; see also SWRCB Order WR 91-1 (modifying earlier public
trust order to incorporate changes agreed to in settlement of litigation challenging that order).
113. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923).
114. See id. at 187.
115. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NExr MERIDIAN 241 (1992).
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distinguish them from private parties. Indeed, if the Owens Valley water rights had
been held by irrigation districts instead of farmers relying on private cooperatives,
the area would have been much better able to protect its water supplies. Using its
power to tax and assess fees, an irrigation district could have assured that as
individual irrigators were bought out the purchaser would have to continue to
support the maintenance of the irrigation ditches.
The law of water rights also includes preferences for municipalities. "6 The
water right permitting system embodies Progressive Era sentiments about water
belonging to the people."' Thus, the state assigned water rights and supported the
development of water by municipalities and special districts with the understanding
that water rights would be held as public property. Application of the Takings
Clause, which prohibits the taking of "private property,""' would alter the
understandings on which the property was acquired.
3. Judicial Takings
To prevail on its claim, LADWP would also have to persuade the Supreme Court
to determine for the first time that the actions of a state court in interpreting its laws
defining property ownership is subject to the Takings Clause. As Professor
Thompson notes in his exhaustive review of the subject, "the most relevant Supreme
Court decisions suggest that courts are absolutely free to make such changes in
property rights..."9 Although Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v.
Washington raises the possibility, the Court has not revisited the issue in thirty
years.1
The Takings Clause does not establish property rights. Takings cases rely on state
law to define property interests.'' If the Supreme Court were not to accept a state
court's definition of property rights, it is left without any clear basis for determining
those property rights. The court risks substituting its own view for those of the state
as to what state law is or should be.
Similarly, there does not appear to be any workable definition as to when a state
court has changed its law too much or too suddenly. There may be a great deal of
uncertainty as to what the law was before the state court decision under challenge
was issued." What one party may characterize as an unprecedented change in the
law, another may see as clarifying prior cases, resolving conflicts among earlier
cases, or applying preexisting principles to new settings or conditions."
Specifically discussing National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, Professor
Thompson observes:
116. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 106.5, 1460-64 (West 1971).
117. See CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971); Attwater & Markle, supra note 19, at 971.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (1990).
120. See id. at 1469.
121. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)
122. See Thompson, supra note 119, at 1530-35.
123. See id. at 1531-32.
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Los Angeles had a reasonable claim under appropriative law to the
water that it was diverting. The public trust doctrine, moreover, was
viewed as irrelevant to water allocation issues, an inhabitant of a
different pigeonhole in the law. But it was only a matter of time before
someone recognized and argued that California's version of the public
trust doctrine, which can prevent a property holder from filling in
portions of a lake or waterway to which they have technical title, seems
equally offended by someone drying up portions of the same waterway.
The California Supreme Court's decision to integrate the two doc-
trines... surprised many people and was certainly a deviation from
most water laiwyers' expectations. Given the underlying tension that
existed in the law, however, it is difficult as a matter of positive law to
say that there was a change in the law and thus a taking."
It should also be recognized that changes in the law may be the cumulative
impact of a number of decisions. Each precedent may itself build on earlier
precedents. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court is in many ways a logical
extension of Marl; v. Whitney,"'2 a 1971 decision which recognized fish and
wildlife habitat and other environmental values among the interests protected by the
public trust."4 While any one decision may not appear sudden or unpredictable in
light of earlier precedents, over time the law may evolve to be dramatically different
from where it began. Yet any attempt to use the Takings Clause as a damper on
state courts' development of state law would lack any objective or workable
standard for determining whether or not changes in the law are acceptable.
4. Limitations that Inhere in the Title
Even if the public trust doctrine had been adopted by an act of the Legislature,
as opposed to being developed through case law, it would be difficult to establish
that the imposition of the public trust doctrine constituted a taking. In particular, it
would be necessary to determine how the economic value of the property had
changed, which in turn would require consideration of how the diversion and use
of water might be limited under principles that were already part of California water
right law before the state recognized the applicability of the public trust.
A water right incorporates these background principles of state law, and a water
right holder has no right to divert water in a manner inconsistent with these
principles of state law. To the extent that these principles of state law could have
restricted Los Angeles' diversions, it cannot be said that comparable limitations
imposed under the public trust doctrine take any property right held by Los Angeles.
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council," no taking occurs, even where the effect is to render property valueless,
where "the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows
124. Id. at 1533.
125. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
126. See id. at 380,
127. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
[Vol. 50:311
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss3/3
LESSONS FROM MONO LAKE
that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with."'2' Put
another way, a statute or regulation changing the nature of property ownership or
restricting its use should be upheld in the face of a takings challenge where the
result can be defended on the basis of limitations which "inhere in the title itself,
in the background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already in
place upon land ownership.'
'
2
This reference to background principles of state law does not depend on any
claim by the state that a challenged regulation or a statute changing the law of water
rights is in furtherance of common law principles, nor is it required that these
background principles have been applied to the property right holder claiming a
taking. As the Supreme Court explained, a regulation does not constitute a taking
if its "effect" is to "do no more than duplicate that which could have been achieved
in the courts by adjacent landowners... or by the State."'3 The quoted passage
refers specifically to common law nuisance actions, but logically applies to any
common law or other background legal principles that could be applied by the
courts. 3'
The California law of water rights imposes a number of limitations on the
exercise of those rights that would make it very difficult to establish that any
particular regulation or change in definition of water rights is a taking.'
a) Permit and License Conditions
Where the law creates property rights subject to conditions or limitations, such
as a condition allowing the government to revoke the right, no compensable taking
occurs when the government exercises that condition or limitation.'33 If the
government takes other action which constitutes a taking, for example through an
exercise of eminent domain, the government is not required to pay for value that
could be removed by exercise of that condition or limitation.'"
The Water Code establishes a condition which severely limits the water right
holder's ability to claim compensation if the water right is taken by the state or one
of its political subdivisions:
Every permittee, if he accepts a permit, does so under the conditions
precedent that no value whatsoever in excess of the actual amount paid
to the State therefor shall at any time be assigned to or claimed for any
128. Id. at 1027.
129. Id. at 1029.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself' The Impact of the Lucas Case on
Western Water Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 943, 943-45 (1993) [hereinafter Sax,
Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself].
132. See generally id.; Tarm L. Mueller, Federal Regulation of Water Resources: Does the Limited
Nature of Property Interests in Water Preclude a Taking?, ENvTL. L. NEws (Envtl. Law Section, State
Bar of Cal., San Francisco, Cal.), Summer 1994, at 2, 11-20 (discussing common law, constitutional, and
statutory limitations on water rights and their impact on potential takings claims).
133. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981).
134. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973).
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permit granted or issued under this division [Division 2 (commencing
with Section 1000 of the Water Code, which includes the water right
permitting and licensing program] ... in respect to any valuation for
purposes of sale to or purchase, whether through condemnation
proceedings or otherwise, by the State or any city ...or political
subdivision of the State, of the rights and property of any permittee, or
the possessor of any rights granted, issued, or acquired under the
provisions of this division.'35
This condition, which is included in LADWP's license and every other water right
permit or license issued in California, reflects a Progressive Era sentiment that water
belongs to the people and should not be given away without reserving an interest
in the public."3 It has the effect of limiting recovery for condemnation of a water
right whether through eminent domain or through inverse condemnation. Even if
LADWP were able to establish that application of the public trust amounted to a
compensable taking, its recovery would be limited to reimbursement for its water
right application fee. Application fees are higher now than at the time LADWP filed
its applications,'37 but still are not high enough to make it worthwhile for a permit
or license holder to bring an inverse condemnation action to challenge the
application of the public trust doctrine.
b) Reasonableness
A much more far reaching limitation, incorporated into every water right, is the
reasonableness doctrine. The 1928 amendment'38 incorporating the reasonableness
doctrine into the California Constitution applies to all uses of water, including
public trust uses.'39 Even before its incorporation into the constitution, the
reasonableness doctrine was an important feature of California water law. 48
"The California courts have also long recognized the reasonableness doctrine as
a limitation that is incorporated into the title of a water right holder. 4' Therefore,
135. CAL WATER CODE § 1392 (West 1971); see also CAL. WATER CODE § 1629 (West 1971)
(setting identical condition for water right licenses).
136. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 19, at 971; see aLvo Andrew H. Sawyer, Hydropower
Relicensing in the Post Dam-Building Era, NAT. REs. & ENv'T, Fall 1996, at 12 (discussing relicensing
requirement for hydroelectric facilities).
137. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1525-36 (West 1971 & Supp. 1997).
138. See CAL. CorisT. art. X, § 2.
139. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725, (Cal. 1983).
140. See, e.g., Barrows v. Fox, 32 P. 811, 811-12 (Cal. 1893); see Mueller, supra note 132, at 13-
14. See generally Brian E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section
2 of the California Conrtitution, 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 225 (1989) (discussing history and effect of
the 1928 amendment, e~pecially its relationship to the common law).
141. See Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 492 (Cal. 1935) ("The right to the waste of water is not
now included in the riparian right."); California Pastoral & Agric. Co. v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co.,
138 P. 718, 721 (Cal. 1909) ("An appropriator['s] ... claim of right can include only such water as is
reasonably necessary fcr the purpose for which the diversion was made, and the water is in fact used.
Such is the full extent of his claim in view of the law relating to the appropriation of water. Such is the
full extent of his claim in view of the law relating to the appropriation of water. His 'color or title'...
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no taking occurs when the reasonableness requirement is applied. "[S]ince there was
and is no property right in an unreasonable use, there has been no taking or
damaging of property by the deprivation of such use and, accordingly, the
deprivation is not compensable."'"4
It has also long been recognized that what constitutes a waste is relative, based
on competing needs, and that the determination may change as conditions
change.'43 Thus, the potential that applicable requirements may change is itself
part of the reasonableness doctrine, and is therefore incorporated into the title held
by a water right holder. While the manner in which the reasonableness doctrine has
evolved may not have been anticipated by LADWP, the potential for change in
response to changing circumstances was well established when LADWP's water
right permits were issued.
The circumstances which may provide a basis for a determination that a diversion
is unreasonable, the cases now recognize, include adverse impacts on fish, wildlife,
and water quality.'" Thus, the authority to reopen LADWP's water rights, for
which the environmental plaintiffs invoked the public trust doctrine in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, could also have been accomplished under the
reasonableness doctrine. Indeed, Decision 1631 invokes the reasonableness standard
in determining an appropriate lake level, and concludes that the changes ordered in
LADWP's diversions are in accord with the reasonableness doctrine.145
Similarly, other water right orders applying requirements for the protection of
instream beneficial uses often invoke both the public trust and reasonableness
doctrines.'" So long as application of the public trust doctrine does not go beyond
what could have been accomplished under the reasonableness doctrine, applying the
public trust to water rights does not take away anything to which the water right
holder held title beforehand.
extends to no other water ... .
142. Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Co., 429 P.2d 889, 898 (Cal. 1967); see also Gin Chow v. City
of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 18 (Cal. 1933) (interpreting the constitutional amendment to define the
riparian right to include a limitation to reasonable use, and holding that this limitation did not amount
to an unconstitutional taking).
143. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. 1935)
("What is a beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. What may
be a reasonable beneficial use, where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a reasonable
beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial use at one time may,
because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time."); Natoma Water and Mining
Co. v. Hancock, 35 P. 334, 337 (Cal. 1894) ("There is but a limited supply of water in this state... and
a paramount public policy requires a careful economy of that supply. So long as there is but a single
appropriator of water on a stream it matters not how imperfect or wasteful may be the means by which
he diverts .... But when subsequent appropriators divert the entire surplus ... he is required to use all
reasonable diligence to husband what is left ... and he cannot complain on account of the trouble and
expense which it may involve.")
144. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (1986).
145. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 121, 196.
146. See, e.g., In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 338 n.16 (Cal. 1988);
SWRCB Order WR 95-4 at 14-17, modified, SWRCB Order WR 95-5; SWRCB Order WR 90-5 at 6-7,
modified, SWRCB Order WR 91-1.
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c) Nuisance
California also has a well-developed law of nuisance, which may be applied to
enjoin pollution or other environmental damage.4 Nuisance law was applied to
water rights in California's first major environmental battle -- the fight by California
farmers and urban dwellers to halt the downstream flooding and destruction caused
by hydraulic mining in the Sierra Nevada. 4' The California Supreme Court
sustained a permanent injunction against a hydraulic mining company whose
extractive activities caused widespread pollution.4 " The decision effectively put
the hydraulic mining industry out of business, after three decades of operation,""
marking the transformation of the California economy from mining to com-
merce.15 1
The California Civil Code, in a section originally enacted in 1872, provides:
Anything which is injurious to health ... or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or
unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner,
of any navigzble lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin .. is a
nuisance."5
This section, which incorporates into statute the state's common law of nuisance, is
broad enough to include protection for instream beneficial uses and other interests
protected by the public trust.
Early California cases have found a public nuisance based on interference with
the public trust. In People v. Truckee Lumber Co., the California Supreme Court
upheld an injunction, on public nuisance grounds, barring the continued operation
of a private sawmill that polluted the Truckee River." In terms that recognize a
public trust interest in fish, the Court observed:
The fish within our waters constitute the most important constituent of
that species of property commonly designated as wild game, the general
147. See also CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324
(1974) ("current legislation for environmental and ecological protection constitutes but 'a sensitizing of
and refinement of nuisance law.'" (citing CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDuc. BAR, CALIFORNIA ZONING
PRACICEn 28-29 (Supp. 1973)). See generally, e.g., People v. Stafford Packing Co., 227 P. 485 (Cal.
1924) (addressing water pollution); Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 271
Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (addressing water pollution); Pfleger v. Superior Court, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (addressing flooding and landslides caused by real estate development);
Centoni v. Ingalls, 298 P. 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (addressing air pollution);
148. See People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152 (Cal. 1884).
149. See id. at 1159-60. A federal court issued its own injunction based on the same legal theory.
See Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 809 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
150. See HUNDLEY, supra note 106, at 77.
151. See National Audubon Soe'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1983).
152. CAL. Civ. CODe § 3479 (West 1997).
153. 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897).
154. See id at 374-75.
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right and ownership of which is in the people of the state [citation] as
in England it was in the king; and the right and power to protect and
preserve such property for the common use and benefit is one of the
recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the
common law . . . The complaint shows that, by the repeated and
continuing acts of defendant, this public property right is being, and will
continue to be, greatly interfered with and impaired, and that such acts
constitute a nuisance .... 15
Similarly, the California courts have found a public nuisance where diversions of
water or discharges of soil, sand and gravel have affected the navigability of waters
of the state."
Thus, nuisance law, like the reasonableness doctrine, could be applied to achieve
the results reached when the public trust doctrine is applied. In fact, the environ-
mental plaintiffs in the Mono Lake litigation raised common law nuisance claims
as part of their arguments for curtailing LADWP's diversions."
As has also more recently been the case with the reasonableness doctrine,
California nuisance cases have long been informed by the public trust doctrine. It
would be difficult at best to distinguish between the results of applying the public
trust doctrine and the results that could have been achieved by applying the state's
law of nuisance. Yet the Supreme Court's Lucas decision clearly states that no
taking occurs, even if property is rendered valueless, by an action which merely
duplicates what could have been achieved by the state courts applying the law of
nuisance.5
d) Prior Rights
In the area of water rights, where each water right holder may use water only to
the extent it is not required to satisfy the rights of other water right holders with
prior rights, the rights of one property owner may effectively be diminished by a
decision which enlarges a prior right or recognizes a prior right that had not
previously been recognized. Indeed, that was the effect of decisions recognizing Los
Angeles' pueblo water right 9
Under California's "dual system," appropriative rights have always been subject
to uncertainty. Because riparian rights ordinarily are senior and are not lost through
155. Id. at 374 (citation omitted).
156. See People v. Russ, 64 P. 111, 112 (Cal. 1901); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4
P. 1152, 1159 (Cal. 1884).
157. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1988).
The plaintiffs raised claims based both on California nuisance law and on arguments that water pollution
caused by concentration of salts in Mono Lake and air pollution caused by the exposure of lakebed as
the level of Mono Lake declined were grounds for enjoining LADWP's diversions under a federal
common law of nuisance. See id. The federal courts dismissed the plaintiffs' federal common law
nuisance claims based in part on the conclusion that California nuisance law was well suited to address
the issues. See id. at 1204. The courts never reached the merits of the state law nuisance claims.
158. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
159. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
1997]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
non-use, even appropriators who have been exercising their rights for a very long
time may be forced to give up their supplies in order to accommodate a new use
by a riparian.
As the nature and extent of the riparian right is enunciated in the principal
California Supreme Court case defining the riparian right and establishing the basic
features of California's "dual system" of water rights,' the riparian right does not
provide for the protection of flows desired to maintain instream beneficial uses on
or adjacent to the property of the riparian landowner.'" But the basis of that
interpretation, that such uses are not "material,"" is inconsistent with current
public policy." . Moreover, in a condemnation case brought by LADWP in
connection with its Mono Basin diversions, California's Third District Court of
Appeal held that resort owners whose lands bordered Mono Lake held riparian
rights to inflows needed to sustain the lake and its surrounding attractions.J
At the same time as other environmental groups sought to protect Mono Lake
based on public trust and nuisance theories, Laurens Silver of the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund pursued a separate legal strategy aimed at protecting Mono Lake
through recognition of a riparian right to inflows necessary to sustain the lake.""
The resort owners whose riparian rights to maintain the natural level of the lake
were recognized by the court of appeals could not bring such an action because
their rights were bought out as part of those same condemnation proceedings.'67
The legal strategy therefore hinged on having the United States assert water rights
as the owner of land adjacent to the lake."~ In litigation between state and federal
governments over title to the land exposed by recession of the Mono Lake, in which
Silver filed a brief supporting the United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the federal government has title to these lands."' In another case in
which Silver filed a brief in support of the federal government, involving a water
right adjudication affecting a national forest elsewhere in California, the California
Supreme Court held that the United States has state riparian rights on federal
reserved lands, including lands reserved for national forest purposes.'7" The federal
160. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 19, at 974. The recognition of a federal reserved right
could have a similar effect. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 19, at 977.
161. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
162. See id. at 757.
163. Id.
164. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1242 (West Supp. 1997).
165. See City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585, 588-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
166. See HART, supra note 84, at 126-27.
167. See City of Los Angeles, 52 P.2d at 587-88.
168. See Hart, supra note 84, at 126-27.
169. See California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 805 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 1986).
170. See In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324,325 (Cal. 1988). The state argued
that federal statutes had relinquished the United States' riparian rights in public domain lands, but the
court held that these statutes merely subordinated the riparian tights for these lands to any water rights
established under state law during the period these lands were held as public domain lands. See id. at
331-35; see also Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321-23 (1994); Mining Act of 1866; 43 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1994). See generally WELLs A. HtrrcHtNs, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RiGHTs 57 (1956)
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lands surrounding Mono Lake are not forested, but were reserved as national forest
lands before LADWP acquired its water right permits, ironically as part of an
LADWP strategy to prevent homesteading that might have established rights senior
to LADWP's appropriations.' If the public trust had not been applied to protect
the natural values of Mono Lake, LADWP could well have faced a challenge based
on claims that its diversions interfered with the United States Forest Service's
riparian rights.'"
The California courts may not recognize a riparian right for instream beneficial
uses, if only because recognition of the public trust makes it unnecessary to
recognize the right." If the courts were to do so, however, it could not be said
that the change was unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedent. Yet the effect
on an upstream appropriator of recognizing a downstream riparian right to instream
uses would largely be the same as the effect of applying the public trust to that
appropriation.'74
The potential effect on appropriators of decisions defining the riparian right
illustrates both the potential for decisions defining water rights to have a widespread
impact on the security of water rights and the unsuitability of the takings doctrine
for protecting the security of water rights. As Professor Freyfogle has observed, the
California Supreme Court's decision recognizing riparian rights on federal lands
"will reshuffle the priorities and security of water rights in California."'1 5 But
supporters of the decision contend that it represents no more than a correct
interpretation of the law based on established precedents. 76 If the Takings Clause
provided a basis for compensation wherein a court decision defining the nature and
extent of a right has the effect of limiting the exercise of the right, a riparian could
claim that opinions which limit the right, including opinions applying the
reasonableness doctrine, amount to a taking." But a court's failure to recognize
(explaining that an appropriative right is superior to a riparian right on land that passed from the public
domain into private ownership after the appropriative right accrued).
171. See HART, supra note 84, at 126; REISNER, supra note 102, at 83-84.
172. See Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 578
nn.53, 56 (Okla. 1993) (recognizing riparian right to instream beneficial uses under Oklahoma law).
173. See id. at 582, 595 (Lavender, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that
instream flows should be addressed as public rights under the public trust doctrine and not as private
riparian rights); see also California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 672,
675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that an appropriative water right cannot be obtained without diversion
or control over the water); Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 520 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (reaching same holding as California Trout).
174. There are important differences, however. Presumably, a privately held riparian right to
instream beneficial uses could be sold or condemned, and the riparian could not later claim a right to
instream uses. Under the public trust doctrine, the state may reopen a water right it has previously
approved.
175. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modem Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1529, 1529 (1989).
176. See In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 334-35 (Cal. 1988) (noting how
both sides argued that their position followed from established precedents).
177. But see Gin Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 18 (Cal. 1933) (rejecting claims that
application of reasonableness doctrine to riparians amounted to an unconstitutional taking). In Franco-
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those limitations would have a similar effect on other water right holders who
would have less water as a result."'
Even in a water rights system that recognizes only appropriative rights, failure to
recognize the limitations on one right has the effect of limiting the exercise of
another. A senior appropriator is protected by the requirement that junior
appropriators curtail their diversions to the extent necessary to satisfy the rights of
the senior appropriators, while junior appropriators are protected against the
enlargement of prior rights."7 Appropriative rights are not defined simply in terms
of a right to a quantity of water, however, but in terms of rate and season of
diversion, point of diversion, place of use, and purpose of use." A senior
appropriator may change its point of diversion, place of use or purpose of use, so
long as the changes do not injure junior appropriators through reduced return flows,
changes in the point of diversion or timing of diversion or use which affect flows
available for downstream diversions, or other factors."' In the context of this
complex interrelationship of rights, issues of how rights are defined - for example,
what kinds of changes in project operations are defined to be changes subject to the
rule that there be no injury to junior appropriators - may substantially affect the
amount to which each appropriator is entitled. As in the case of riparian rights, the
application or failure to apply the reasonableness doctrine to any particular
appropriator may also affect the amount available for other appropriators.
e) The Public Trust as Part of "Background Principles"
Assuming that the public trust in water is not itself invalid as an uncompensated
taking - and as indicated in the above discussion it almost certainly is not - the
public trust doctrine is part of the "background principles" against which other laws
and regulations affecting water use are judged. This principle apparently would
apply not only to state regulation in furtherance of public trust interests, but also to
American Charolaise, the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated a 1963 Oklahoma statute that allowed
riparian right holders to initiate new domestic uses, but otherwise abrogated unexercised riparian rights,
Interpreting the takings cause of the Oklahoma Constitution, the court reasoned that the Legislature has
no power to modify vested rights. See Franco-American Charolaise, 855 P.2d at 576. The California
courts have rejected similar legal arguments. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Cal.
1976) ("The vesting of property rights.., does not render them immutable."); see also Franco-American
Charolaise, 855 P.2d at 596 (Reif, S.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Special Justice Reif
argued that the critical issue is not the nature of the right, but the power to make changes: "Although
such power has been most commonly exercised by the courts, it is not exclusively within the ambit of
judicial power to weigh competing interests, to define or refine legal rights, and furnish remedies and
other means to protect such rights. The legislature unquestionably has such power as well." Id.
178. See Attwater and Markle, supra note 19, at 978 n.87 (discussing fears that enormous quantities
of water would be tied up, leaving insufficient supplies for the appropriators, if a reasonableness
requirement were not applied to riparians).
179. See George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 1, 8-9 (1988).
180. See id. at 12.
181. See id. at 13-18.
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federal requirements such as limitations imposed under the Clean Water Act or the
Endangered Species Act.'"
California is the only state that has a well-developed public trust doctrine in water
rights.'" Thus, similar requirements applied by state regulatory agencies, or the
same regulatory requirements applied by a federal agency, might be valid in
California but an unconstitutional taking in California.
A similar disparity may arise in the application of the common law of nuisance,
which is well developed in California but may have much less expansive reach in
another state. In a sense, the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council decision, in
formulating the nuisance exception to the takings doctrine, created fifty different
tests of what constitutes a taking, each depending on the common law of the state
where the property is held. Yet the problem is largely unavoidable.
This difference in the how the takings doctrine is applied from state to state could
have been reduced, but not completely eliminated, if the Court had adopted the
dissenting views of Justices Blackmun and Stevens that state regulation should be
permitted for "harmful or noxious uses" even where those activities are not
categorized as public nuisances under the law of the particular state where the
property is located.'" But the problem would still arise of how to treat the
situation where a state court interprets its common law to impose restrictions on
uses which are not encompassed within the Court's definition of "harmful or noxious
uses."
Alternatively, the Court could adopt its own limitations on common law doctrines,
establishing the outer reach beyond which a state's background principles cannot be
182. See Mueller, supra note 132, at 11-20. See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1631
(1994). As the Supreme Court explained, there is no taking if regulation duplicates what "could have
been achieved in the courts" under background legal principles. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). Arguably, a distinction could be made between regulation interpreting or
in furtherance of background legal principles and regulation which merely achieves that same results as
could have been achieved under those background principles. But the Court did not make that distinction,
and such a distinction would be very difficult to apply. State legislation may interpret or refine doctrines
like nuisance law or the public trust doctrine without expressly mentioning those background principles.
See California Trout v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (stating that the Fish and Game Code provisions requiring passage of water to keep fish in good
condition downstream of dams are a legislative expression of the public trust). Regulation in furtherance
of background legal principles such as nuisance law may also be adopted by the federal government. See
1, 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AIR & WATER §§ 3.1, 4.1 (1986) (discussing
common law bases for provisions of federal air and water pollution control legislation).
183. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust
in Western Water, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 701,726-36 (1995) (discussing public trust doctrine in other western
states, observing that no case outside of California has applied the public trust doctrine to an existing
water right).
In 1996, Idaho enacted legislation declaring the public trust to be inapplicable to water rights. See
Idaho Code § 58-1203(b) (West Supp. 1997). See generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the
Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. No.
3 (forthcoming 1997) (contending that the legislation is unconstitutional).
184. See Lucas, 503 U.S. at 1036, 1047-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1061, 1067-71 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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used to avoid a taldng. Where Justice Stevens' approach would establish a floor
where regulation is exempt from regulatory takings challenges even where state law
does not categorize an activity as a nuisance, such an approach would establish a
ceiling where regulation may be subject to a takings challenge even where state law
categorizes the prohibited activity as a nuisance. But such an approach would be
fraught with difficulty.
The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council consciously adopted what
Professor Thompson calls a "positivist" rather than a "normative" view of
property." For the Court to adopt its own federal common law as a limitation on
state authority would reinstate a normative approach and would create a number of
problems. The court would be faced with a potentially tremendous workload, as it
is asked to second guess state court decisions interpreting the common law. When
it did, the Court would be accused, with some justification, of substituting its own
values for that of the state on matters of state law. To the extent that the Supreme
Court, in overturning a state's interpretation of its own law, assigns property to
private parties that the state attempted to reserve to itself when it initially assigned
a property right, the Court would in effect be taking public property for private use
instead of preventing the taking of private property for public use. Moreover, it is
not necessarily wrong that the same regulation could constitute a taking in one state
but not another, because the property owner's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations should differ based on what the laws of each state define the property
owner's right to be.
Professor Sax argues that the Court's agenda in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council is to send a clear message that states cannot require a landowner to
maintain property in its natural condition." To the extent that the public trust
doctrine or other background principles of state law so require, however, the opinion
does not preclude the state from regulating to protect property in its natural state.
The Court's formulation based in limitations that inhere in the title, instead of
relying on expectations of the property owner, almost certainly was intended to
strengthen the claims of property owners against arguments that their rights must
be adjusted to accommodate changing public needs and values.'87 In the case of
water rights, however, this formulation works against property owners: the common
expectation of water right holders is that they hold rights far more secure than is in
fact provided for under the background principles of water rights.' 8
5. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
As applied to LADIWP's Mono Basin diversions in Decision 1631, most of the
long term reduction in diversions required to protect public trust uses of Mono Lake
was also required to provide flows in the Mono tributaries in compliance with
185. Thompson, supre note 119, at 1522-27.
186. See Joseph L. Sag., Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1438 (1993) [hereinafter Sax, Property Rights].
187. See Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself, supra note 131, at 944-45.
188. See id. at 945-46.
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section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code. After an initial transition period,
providing flows in the four tributaries consistent with section 5937 would reduce
LADWP's diversions by an average of 35,200 acre feet per year, while an additional
reduction of 8,500 acre feet per year would be necessary to protect public trust uses
of Mono Lake.'89 Thus, it would be difficult to establish that applying the public
trust could constitute a taking unless applying section 5937 of the Fish and Game
Code was also a taking.' But the requirements of section 5937 were in effect
when LADWP was issued its water right permits.
Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council on limitations that "inhere in the title itself' or are "background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance,"'' there undoubtably are other
circumstances where state laws will not be subject to a takings challenge because
the Court will not recognize a "reasonable, investment-backed expectation"'" to
violate those laws. Of course, the Court's effort to restrict regulations which can
survive a takings challenge to those which can be defended on the basis of
limitations which inhere in the title applies only in the context of regulation that
deprives land of all economic value.'93 Where some value remains, even if the
value of the property has been sub'stantially diminished, the degree of interference
with reasonable, investment-backed expectations, and hence the extent to which the
property has long been subject to regulation, is a relevant factor in determining
whether there has been a taking."
Even in the context of regulation which leaves the property without substantial
value, there likely are circumstances where the Court will uphold the regulation on
the grounds that the property owner could not have a reasonable expectation that it
may violate the regulation. As Justice Kennedy framed the issue in his concurring
opinion: "Property is bought and sold, investments are made, subject to the State's
power to regulate. Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the
property of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to
reasonable, investment-backed expectations.""' In particular, the Court may find
that a property owner's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable, and no
taking has occurred, where the property owner seeks to operate in violation of
statutes or regulations which were in effect when the property owner acquired the
property.
189. See SWRCB Decision 1631, supra note 1, at 163-64.
190. The reduction in diversions attributable solely to what was required to maintain public trust
values at Mono Lake is approximately 11% of what LADWP has authorized to divert under its original
permits, or about 22% of the amount of diversion authorized after the requirement for maintain fish in
good condition in the tributary streams is taken into account. See id. A decline in value of that
magnitude would not be sufficient to establish a regulatory taking. See supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
191. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
192. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
193. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
194. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
195. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The requirement that dam owners bypass or release sufficient water to maintain
fish in good condition, now codified in section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code,
has been in effect in substantially the same terms since 1937, three years before
LADWP first obtained water right permits for its Mono Basin diversions.' The
SWRCB's predecessor did not include the requirement in water right permits,
however. The SWRCB's predecessor had no authority at that time either to apply
the requirement or to exempt projects from it."9 Although the requirement was not
expressly made a limitation on water right permits and licenses, the requirement
could be enforced independent of those permits and licenses. A criminal prosecution
could be brought for violation of the requirement.9 '
In the California Trout litigation, LADWP argued that section 5937 was not a
limitation on the amount of water that may be appropriated, even if any remaining
flows that are not appropriated are insufficient to keep alive any fish that lived
below the dam before the appropriation." The California courts never endorsed
that interpretation, however, and the statute on its face applies to the operation of
any dam.' It cannot be said that a water right holder that obtained its permit after
enactment of the requirement, now codified in section 5937 of the Fish and Game
Code, had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that it could divert water
from a dam in a manner that impaired or destroyed fish downstream without ever
being required to bypass or release water to correct the problem.'
If, instead of accepting Decision 1631, LADWP had renewed its takings
challenge, LADWP would have had an additional argument as to why it did not
believe section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code would be applied to it. In 1940,
the California Fish and Game Commission approved a negotiated agreement under
which LADWP provided partial funding for construction of a hatchery on Hot
Creek, a tributary of the Owens River, instead of constructing fishways at its Mono
196. See CAL. FisH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 1984).
197. See supra notes 7, 25-27, 62 and accompanying text. The SWRCB has been required to apply
the requirement in permits issued for projects in Mono and Inyo Counties since 1953. See CAL. WATER
CODE § 5946 (West 1984). Since 1975, the SWRCB has applied the requirement statewide to all permits
issued for diversions from rivers and streams by means of a dam. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 782
(1995); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 192 n.4 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
198. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 12000 (West Supp. 1997).
199. See California Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
200. See id. at 195.
201. The California Attorney General at one time endorsed, and later abandoned, the argument
LADWP made in the California Trout litigation. See 57 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 577, 579-83 (1974)
(reviewing the reasoning of the earlier opinion and finding it was no longer valid); 18 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 31 (1951) (concluding that the statute did not affect appropriation of water). Opinions of the
Attorney General are advisory only, however, and do not have the force of law. See Sanchez v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 747 (Cal. 1977); People v. Vallerga, 136 Cal. Rptr. 429,
441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); State Water Resources Control Bd. Order WQ 82-1 at 4-5. To the extent that
reliance on an opinion of the Attorney General could support claims of a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation for purposes of a takings analysis, the narrow construction of § 5937 of the Fish and Game
Code once espoused by the Attorney General would have little bearing in cases where the dam was built
before 1951, and no bearing where the dam was built after 1974.
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Basin diversions. The agreement expressly provided that LADWP was released
from its obligations under certain provisions of the Fish and Game Code, including
the provision now codified as section 5937.' The California Trout court held that
the state was not estopped from applying the requirement for bypassing or releasing
water to maintain fish in good condition. By the terms of the applicable
provisions of the Fish and Game Code, the commission was authorized to approve
construction of a hatchery in lieu of a fishery, but not to excuse dam owners from
the requirement of bypassing or releasing water for protection of fish downstream
from the dam.' While the hatchery agreement would not prevent the state from
applying section 5937, it could have provided a basis for an argument by LADWP
that, in considering whether application of the public trust amounted to a taking, the
full extent to which its diversions were reduced should be taken into account, even
where those reductions were also required to comply with section 5937.
Section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code could pose an especially difficult
problem for other water right holders seeking to establish that applying the public
trust to their diversions would amount to a taking. Few other water right holders
will be able to point to an agreement with the Fish and Game Commission which
purports to relieve them of the requirement to comply with section 5937 of the Fish
and Game Code. In addition, it will often be the case that the flows required to
comply with section 5937 and the flows required to protect public trust uses will be
the same."5
Thus, section 5937 could pose a serious causation problem for a water right
holder claiming that application of the public trust resulted in a taking. The water
right holder's loss, or much of it, may have been caused by the statutory re-
quirement to limit diversions as needed to keep fish in good condition. In addition,
section 5937 poses a serious theoretical obstacle to a takings claim. The public trust
doctrine would not appear to be a sudden change in state law, as LADWP
contended in seeking Supreme Court review, if it is similar to, and in many cases
duplicates the effect of, a statute long on the books.
IlI. Water as a Shared Resource
As the above discussion indicates, applying the public trust to water rights does
not constitute a taking of private property for public use. Water rights in California
are held subject to the public trust. The public trust doctrine sets a limitation which
202. See California Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
203. See id. at 205-06.
204. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5937, 5938 (West 1984).
205. See, e.g., Cal. State Water Resources Control Bd. Order WR 95-4 at 18-19, 30-34, modified,
Cal. SWRCB Order WR 95-5. There will, however, be cases where § 5937 of the Fish and Game Code
does not apply but the public trust doctrine requires that diversions be cut back to protect fish. Section
5937 applies only in cases where there is a dam. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 1984).
"Dam" is defined broadly to include any artificial obstruction, but does not include diversions by means
such as wells used to pump from the subsurface flow of the stream, even where surface and subsurface
flows are connected and pumping from subsurface flows affects total streamflows to the detriment of fish
downstream. See id. § 5900(a); Cal. State Water Resources Control Bd. Order WR 97-02, at 11-12.
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inheres in the title conveyed to a water right holder. This limitation "prevents any
party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the
interests protected by the public trust."' Even if a judicial taking could be
established based on a court decision which abruptly and without any support in
earlier precedents redefines the interest held in property, the application of the
public trust to water rights would not constitute a taking. Recognition of the public
trust was not an abrupt change in the law, but an extension of established principles
from one area of the law, rights to tidelands and lakeshores, to a related area, rights
to the use of water. This extension of the public trust to water was a continuation
of trends in the law already visible in other doctrines which had long been
recognized to apply to water rights, including the reasonableness doctrine and the
law of nuisance.
If the application of the public trust would not be a taking, then it would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to establish that the application a state or federal
regulatory program for the protection of instream beneficial uses or other public
trust values amounts to a taking. Actions taken under these regulatory programs do
not constitute a taking if "the result could have been achieved in the courts" based
on limitations that "inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance,"' including the public trust
and reasonableness doctrines.
The regulatory t-kings doctrine may have little bearing on actions affecting
California water rights. As applied to water rights, the applicability of the Takings
Clause may effectively be limited to its original intent: to require compensation
when private property is taken "for public use";2  for example, where the
government takes over a privately owned water right and uses that right as part of
a project to deliver water for irrigation or municipal use. Where the government
regulates water diversion and use to prevent harm to public trust uses, on the other
hand, there is no basis for a takings claim.
In contrast, the regulatory takings doctrine is becoming increasingly important in
land use issues, where regulations established for important environmental purposes
may nevertheless be determined to violate the Takings Clause."' This raises the
issue of how the nature of the property interest in water, or the state's interest in
water, is different than when land is involved.
206. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727, (Cal. 1983).
207. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
208. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
209. Even in these circumstances, the amount of compensation may be limited. See CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1392, 1629 (West 1971).
210. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (exaction requiring dedication as a
public greenway of the portion of the property that was in the floodplain); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (development setback on coastal barrier island to prevent beach
and dune erosion); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (exaction for purpose of
public access to a coastal beach).
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A. A Shared Right to Use
Several features of the property interest in water distinguish it from interests in
land. A water right is a right to use of water, not ownership of the water itself.21'
This use right is not exclusive. To the extent that an owner with paramount rights
does not need to use the water, it cannot prevent others from making use of the
water.'22 Indeed, one of the key features of a system by which water rights are
allocated and administered is that it promotes the maximum beneficial use of
available water supplies by allowing diversion and use of waters that either are not
used by or constitute the return flows from waters used by senior water right
holders. 3 When a senior water right holder leaves its land fallow, others with
lower priorities may make use of the available water until the land is irrigated again.
Downstream appropriators may make use of return flows from upstream ap-
propriators, with the same water being used over and over again.
This sharing of the resource is in marked contrast to the property interest in land,
where the property owner has title to the land itself, and has the right to keep others
from using it. The Supreme Court has emphasized that "the landowner's right to
exclude [is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.-'' 2 4 Not only does the water right holder lack
a right to exclude others from using what the water right holder does not use, its
right to use is itself limited, especially under the reasonableness doctrine, to protect
other users. 5
B. State Interest
These limitations on a water right to protect other uses are based not only on the
private property rights of other users, but on the state's interest in how its limited
resources are used.26 The reasonableness doctrine, in particular, is based on
recognition that because water is in scarce supply the state has an interest in making
sure it is not wasted
2 17
211. See Cal. Water Code § 102 (West 1971); 1 ROBERT E. BECK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs
§ 4.01, at 65-67 (1991 ed.).
212. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (Vest 1971); Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 223 P.2d 209,
212 (Cal. 1950).
213. See generally CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("Mhe general welfare requires that the water resources
of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable."); Gould, supra note
179, at 5-12 (discussing the definition of water rights, emphasizing relationship between flows, including
return flows, available at any given time, and demands on those flows at that time).
214. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
215. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
216. See Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967).
217. See, e.g., Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935) ("When the supply is limited public
interest requires that there be the greatest number of the beneficial uses which the supply can yield.")
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Justice Holmes, who authored the opinion establishing the regulatory takings
doctrine,"'8 also authored an opinion taking the view that the Takings Clause does
not limit a state's authority to regulate its water resources!"9
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent
of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain
the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by
such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit
for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. . . .It is
fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private property of [water
right holders] cannot be supposed to have deeper roots. Whether it be
said that such an interest justifies the cutting down . . . of what
otherwise would be private right of property, or that... those rights do
not go to the height of what [the water right holder] seeks to do, the
result is the same ..... The private right to appropriate is subject not
only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it
may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public
welfare and healthY'
In sum, the property interest in water is not only a right to use the resource, but
a responsibility to avoid abuses that would harm other users or the state's interest
in effective use of the resource. As Professor Freyfogle has observed in contrasting
water rights with other property rights:
With the new and growing limits on the irresponsible use of water, it
is now no longer permissible for a person of wealth to purchase a
property right in water and then uselessly to destroy or waste it. A
slumlord, it seems, can still "use" his property as a resting spot for a
dilapidated, vacant building. A forest owner can still clearcut trees on
a steep slope and watch eiosion destroy centuries of soil growth. A
vegetable farmer can toss out tons of carrots because they are slightly
oversized, despite the fact that some people go hungry. All of these
people can stand on their property rights today and can claim, not just
membership, but high status in our exploitive society.'
As conditions change, the delineation of "irresponsible use" and the limitations that
may be imposed on a water right holder may also change. In declaring that private
rights are subject to the state's paramount interest in its waters, Justice Holmes
continued: "We are of the opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the State
to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not
218. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
219. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
220. Id. at 356.
221. Freyfogle, supra note 175, at 1548.
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dependent upon by any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as
to future needs."m
C. Changing Landscapes and Evolving Law
The extent to which conditions are subject to change is another feature that
distinguishes interests in water from interests in land. As the California Supreme
Court has observed in discussing the reasonableness requirement:
The waters of our streams are not like land which is static, can be
measured and divided, and the division remains the same. Water is
constantly shifting, and the supply changes to some extent every day.
A stream supply may be divided but the product of the division in no
wise remains the same.m
Moreover, the amount of water reliably available probably is substantially less than
was thought when water rights were originally perfected. Recent studies indicate
that over the past 150 years, the climate in the Sierra Nevada was wetter and more
stable than has generally been the case.' Water right holders who believe they
have a reliable supply because flows recorded in this century have been adequate
for diversion under their priority of right may find their supplies unreliable if the
climate returns to the drier, less stable conditions that once prevailed.
It is for this reason that, at least in the area of water rights, the law of takings
cannot rely on the subjective expectations of the water right holder. Just as the
subjective expectations may fail to fully understand the potential impact of senior
claims, water right holders have failed to anticipate the potential severity of drought.
Relying on more objective measures such as market values does not resolve these
concerns. It may overcome the problems of proving what expectations in fact were,
but to the extent that unrealistic assumptions about climate are held in common,
they would be reflected in the market price.
At first glance, the constantly changing nature of the resource may appear to
distinguish water from land. Unlike the amount of water available for appropriation,
the amount of land available for use would not appear to fluctuate over time, or to
be substantially less in the future than was assumed when land titles were
established. But the difference is one of degree. Landscapes, like water supplies,
change over time. The case relied on in LADWP's taking argument, Hughes v.
Washington,' involves the issue of who holds title where land adjacent to a
waterway is gained or lost through accretion. An issue being given increasing
attention as a result of flooding in recent years is the natural tendency for rivers to
222. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 356-57.
223. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1935).
224. See I CENTER FOR WATER & WILD LAND REsOURcES, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, SIERRA
NEVADA ECOSYSTEM PROJECT: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: STORMS OF THE SIERRA NEVADA 9
(1996). "One implication of a longer view of climate is, for instance, that the "droughts' of the mid-
1970's and mid-1980's were actually not droughts at all, relative to the century-long dry periods that have
been common in Sierran climate history." Id.
225. 329 U.S. 290 (1967).
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meander and the need to give the rivers room to move for both public safety and
preservation of fish and wildlife habitat.'
The coastline, too, is moving. One of the most important recent takings cases,
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,=7 involved a coastal development permit
condition requiring a Ventura County, California beachfront property owner to allow
public access to cross a strip of beach between the mean high tide line and the
landowner's seawall. The mean high tide line in the area is constantly shifting,
ranging from about ten feet from the seawall when the water is at its lowest to the
seawall itself when the water is at its highest' z Within a relatively short period,
sea level is expected to rise to the point where the entire area subject to the
condition will be property of the state. A recent study indicates that with a two foot
rise in sea level, projected to occur by 2040, the Ventura County shoreline could
recede by fifty to seventy-five yards.' The change in coastline has profound
implications both for coastal economic development and environmental resources,
such as coastal wetlands.' Our land use laws and policies will have to adapt to
these changing circumstances.
In water rights, the law has been constantly adapting to changing conditions and
changing needs. Throughout the history of water development in California, new
water law doctrine. have been developed, or doctrines from other areas of the law
have been imported into water law, to the delight of those who see a need for
change and to the dismay of others who decry the apparent instability.' In an
opinion rejecting a water right holder's claim that applying the reasonableness
doctrine interfered with the water right holder's vested rights, 2 a state court of
appeal emphasized the dynamic nature of water right law:
It is time to recognize that this law is in flux and that its evolution has
passed beyond traditional concepts of vested and immutable rights....
Professor Freyfogle explains that California is engaged in an evolving
process of governmental redefinition of water rights. He concludes that
'California has regained for the public much of the power to prescribe
water use practices, to limit waste, and to sanction water transfers.' He
asserts that the concept that 'water use entitlements are clearly and
permanently defined,' and are 'neutral [and] rule-driven,' is a pretense
226. See JEFFREY F. MoUNT, CALIFORNIA RIVERS AND STREAMs: THE CONFLICr BETWEEN FLUVIAL
PROCESS AND LAND USE 309-10 (1995).
227. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
228. See id. at 850-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229. See A. Constable et al., Demographic Responses to Sea Level Rise in California, 9 WORLD
RESOURCE REV. 32 (1997).
230. See id.
231. See Gray, supra note 140, at 227 ("[S]ince its inception in 1855 California water rights law
has developed pragmatically to facilitate the accomplishment of changing economic and, more recently,
environmental purposes"). See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 106, at 406-22.
232. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 259-61
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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to be discarded. It is a fundamental truth, he writes, that 'everything is
in the process of changing or becoming' in water law. 3
The dynamic character of the law is relevant to the takings analysis, because it
bears on the reasonable expectations of the property owner.' To the extent that
changes in the law are through judicial interpretation of common law or background
principles such as nuisance, the reasonableness doctrine or the public trust, those
changes are effectively immune from takings challenges."5
Comparing property rights to water and land, Professor Freyfogle has observed:
Property rights in general change over time with the inexorable flow of
the common law. But in the water law setting, temporal change is more
expressly incorporated into the property right itself. A water user who
begins a new use, perhaps with heavy capitalization, faces the prospect
that her water use will someday become unreasonable, even if
reasonable when begun; that someday it will cause unacceptable
environmental damage or be needed by a nearby growing metropolitan
area. A water right, then, exists in time as well as in spaceY6
By defining a property owner's expectations in terms of the state's law of
property, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council appears
to be attempting to cut off arguments that the state can change the law in response
to changing public needs and values. " 7 The Court's formulation cannot fully
insulate property owner expectations, however, because background principles of
state law include the common law, which itself adapts to changing conditions. Real
property law for land may not be changing as rapidly as the law of water rights, but
it is also in flux. Professor Sax points out that property definitions have always
been dynamic. 8
The "background principles" of nuisance and property law to which the Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council majority refers are comprised largely of the rights
and burdens established in the industrial era, which in turn replaced a different
balance than that which applied in previous times. 9 To the extent that the Lucas
Court's formulation actually serves to prevent changes in these common law
conceptions of property, it is because recent changes in the law have been made
more frequently by statute than by common law. The common law is in a state of
arrested development because modem environmental statutes have made it
unnecessary for the common law to adapt.
233. Id. at 267 (quoting Freyfogle, supra note 175, at 1546-47).
234. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Mhe test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expec-
tations. ... [If the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise
of governmental authority, property tends to become what the courts say it is.")
235. See id. at 1029; supra notes 127-88 and accompanying text.
236. Freyfogle, supra note 175, at 1542.
237. See Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself', supra note 131, at 944-45.
238. See Sax, Property Rights, supra note 186, at 1446.
239. See id. at 1454-55.
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The attempt to segregate changes in the law between statutory changes and
common law changes is artificial, and in some areas may prove unworkable.
Statutes and the common law interact and evolve together.' Some statutes codify
the common law, others are assimilated into it. 4' California's common law of
nuisance, for example, is codified in statute but still interpreted as a common law
doctrine.z Regulatory standards help define what is reasonable for purposes of
common law liability. 3
The reasonableness doctrine - the overarching principle of California water
rights law and the source of so much change over the years - began as a common
law doctrine, was adopted into the state constitution, and continues to evolve in
response to changing conditions and needs.' California's constitutional
amendment incorporates the common law doctrine, while overruling a judicial
decision that refused to extend the reasonableness doctrine to situations where waste
of water by a riparian harmed an appropriator."4s As noted by the dissenter in that
case, however, that limitation on the applicability of the reasonableness doctrine was
not immutable:
One of the characteristics of the common law is that it contains within
itself its own repealer; that is to say it changes as conditions change and
adapts itself to new conditions, ex proprio vigore. It should be applied
to our conditions when our conditions are similar to those out of which
the common law arose, but when the common law is not applicable,
because of different conditions, it should not be applied.'
The judicial decision that precipitated the constitutional amendment could have been
decided differently, and could have been overruled by the court at later time.
At this point, the reasonableness doctrine must be considered part of the
background principles that inhere in the title of every water right holder, even as
applied to situations where the constitutional amendment overruled earlier common
law precedents. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate the difficulties with the Court's
formulation in Luca? v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which seeks to divorce the
common law from its context within a body of law that is increasing codified in
statute.
Water law differs from the law governing interests in land, both in degree to
which the law has changed over the years and the form of that change, with
developments in water law still taking place largely though case-by-case evolution.
240,. See generally, Hon. Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH.
U.L. REv. 401 (1968) (discussing how statutes and common law decisions borrow from each other).
241. See at 410-11.
242. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (West Supp. 1997).
243. See Traynor, supra note 240, at 415-16.
244. See Gray, supra note 231, at 250-62.
245. See id. at 263-64.
246. See Herminghrus v. Southern Cal. Edison, Co., 252 P. 607, 625 (Cal. 1927) (Shenk, J.,
dissenting).
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These differences account in large measure for the dissimilarity in how the takings
doctrine impacts water and land but may not justify the dissimilarity.
D. The Justice and Fairness of the Obligations of Stewardship
This leaves the question of whether the property interest in land should not be
more like water rights. The water right is held subject to responsibilities to
accommodate other water users. Over time, these responsibilities have been
enlarged to include responsibilities for the protection of instream beneficial uses.?
Land ownership could be interpreted to include similar responsibilities." Aldo
Leopold advocated a "Land Ethic," incorporating responsibilities to the natural
community."' Consistent with this view, property ownership could be interpreted
to include concepts of stewardship, and move away from concepts of absolute
dominion, as it long since has in the area of water rights.
There is substantial controversy as to whether the direction of public policy
should be to promote stewardship, or to promote a strategy of resource exploitation.
It is at the heart of a wide range of controversies involving preservation of
resources, ranging from historic structures to prime agricultural lands to old growth
forests. Should the Takings Clause be interpreted to take sides in this debate? At
the heart of the regulatory takings doctrine is a determination that ".justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons.""z Stewardship may impose substantial costs, even hardship, on those
assigned responsibilities,"' but failure to recognize responsibilities of landowner-
ship also imposes hardships, both on individuals and the public at large. If our
society decides that property ownership should include responsibilities for protection
of environmental values, as the California courts have done, that decision
necessarily includes a determination of what justice and fairness require.
247. See Gray, supra note 231, at 268-72.
248. Professor Freyfogle has advocated making land ownership more like ownership of a water
right:
If property law does develop like water law, it will increasingly exist as a collection of
use-rights, rights defined in specific contexts and in terms of similar rights held by other
people. Property use entitlements will be phrased in terms of responsibilities and accom-
modations rather than rights and autonomy. A property entitlement will acquire its bounds
from the particular context of its use, and the entitlement holder will face the obligation
to accommodate the interests of those affected by his water use.
Freyfogle, supra note 175, at 1531.
249. ALDo LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 217-41 (1966).
250. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
251. A more recent innovation in resource protection programs has been the use of transfer of
development credits or similar tools to reduce the impact on property owners who are substantially
affected. The regulatory program at issue in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659,
1662 (1997), includes an elaborate system of development credits to maintain property value for owners
of wetlands or other environmentally sensitive lands where development is prohibited.
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